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HOW TO REGULATE INTERNET : NEW PARADIGMS FOR
INTERNET GOVERNANCE
SELF-REGULATION : VALUE AND LIMITS *
Yves POULLET **
« We should like to stress the State’s vital
obligation to intervene at a time when, in
our opinion, deserting the Internet and
withdrawing from the field of regulation to
such a point that it no longer even decides
the general framework, would notably put
at risk public order, fundamental liberties
and other basic values ».
Yves POULLET
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. POSITIONING THE PROBLEM
In a recent Bibliography on self-regulation on the Internet, a report
prepared for the OECD1 stated : « while there is a broad consensus that self
regulation of the Internet is critical to its future growth, there is little
consensus about how to achieve and to implement a self-regulatory
régime ». Self-regulation is a word and a myth : the concept is presented as
an adequate solution due to the disintegration of traditional sovereignty
paradigms (J. Reidenberg, 1996) on which the traditional regulatory powers
given to constitutional State authority was founded. This phenomenon must
be analysed in its context. Overtime, the functioning of the traditional
constitutional bodies has been deeply modified to face the new challenges
which have steamed from the development of the cyberspace and finally, we
have to point out the important role of technical choices in order to rule
                                                
* This paper was presented in the context of a conference organized by the Universities of Torino
(Italia) and Yale (USA). Erosion of Sovereignty in the Age of Digital Media, Oct. 25 and 26 th
October 1999.
** Professor Law Faculty ; Director of the CRID – FUNDP-University of Namur.
We would like to express our gratitude to Laetitia ROLIN, and Sophie LOUVEAUX researchers at
the CRID for their comments. This study was realised with the financial support of the SSTC
(Belgian Prime Minister Services) in the context of the I.A.P. (Interuniversitarian Attraction Pole)
Programme.
1. See in the bibliography, the report quoted Intern t Law and Policy Forum.
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certain behaviours in cyberspace. Which relationships between these
different regulatory methods ? And to what extent, is self-regulation
developing peculiarities in the rule-making of the Global Information
Society ?
The first part of this paper will identify the different regulatory
techniques applicable to the Internet or generally to information
superhighways; the second part covers the various responses in domestic and
supranational law to these different regulatory techniques and envisages
some criteria to enable the legitimisation of non law-based regulatory
systems. Particularly, apart from a certain number of recent European texts,
we will attempt to define the European position on the development of these
new regulatory techniques and which request the status of legal rules.
CHAPTER 1 : THE VARIOUS REGULATORY TECHNIQUES ON
THE INTERNET
A. On the diversity of regulatory models
2. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The goal of regulation is the prescription of behavioural norms. There
is a great diversity of regulatory models and the norms can be divided into
four categories according to their scope of application : the object, the
author, the subject and the sanction of the norm.
We may note from the outset that the international dimension of the
Internet leads to a certain “competition“ between different forms of national
regulation. As soon as one country decides to regulate certain activities, the
parties concerned by the legislation are free to move their activities to
another country with a more flexible and less strict regulatory framework.
This phenomenon of « regulatory dumping » is real (Y. Poullet, R. Queck,
1997).
On the other hand, it must be noted that consumers prefer the security
granted by a regulatory environment that takes better care of their interests.
This second aspect should not be neglected.
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3. SELF -REGULATION AND ITS MULTIPLE FORMS : AN ENUMERATION
It is impossible to name all the normative sources of law on the
Internet. The public sources of law, the domestic and international norms
stand in contrast with the private ones, i.e. the self-regulation. P. Trudel
(1989) defines this concept as « norms voluntarily developed and accepted
by those who take part in an activity ». Self-regulation encompasses a large
number of concepts such as codes of conduct, model contracts, codes of
ethics, memorandum of understanding, technical or administrative standards,
certification or labelling systems. The technology itself (cf. infra n°  13) may
equally have a normative effect on behaviour and might become a source of
the Internet Law when the parties are contractually referring to it or when an
authority imposes it as a de iure (or de facto) technical standard. Some
authors see self-regulation as an emerging « lex electronica » parallel to the
former « lex mercatoria » but developed within an electronic context.
We are facing a proliferation of such regulatory techniques, sometimes
drawn up locally in a university or in a newsgroup, sometimes on a larger
scale for a direct marketing sector or even for the broad mass of activities on
the net (National charters). At a global level, the Internet Society, (a purely
private organisation entrusted with assuring the international co-operation
and co-ordination in technology and programming for the Internet),
publishes directive guidelines for Internet and network use.
This self-regulation, including the standard setting process « affects
fundamental public concerns and are no longer technical rules of purely
commercial interest » (J. Reidenberg, 1996). This fact has been clearly
recognised by the authors of the self-regulation. On that point, we would like
to quote the declaration of the Internet Society president, V. Cerf, who
affirms that : « It is no longer adequate to base guidelines for conduct purely
on the basis of who pays for the underlying network or computer systems
resources. Even if that was once sensible, the diversity of constituents of the
Internet makes it a poor basis for formulating policy. Thus guidelines for
conduct have to be constructed and motivated in part on the basis of self-
interest. Many of the suggestions below are based on the theory that
enlightened self-interest can inform and influence choices of behaviour »(V.
Cerf, 1994).
4. SELF -REGULATION : FROM NORMS TO A COMPLETE LEGAL SYSTEM
As regards these private sources, we may observe that self-regulation is
not limited to isolated norms but more and more encompasses a set of
structured norms and provides not only contents but also the means to
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enforce these rules. The actors themselves have developed means to ensure
that the self-regulatory code passes from the letter to the act. The typical
sanctions in the regulation of a network, such as disconnection and «
flaming » remind strangely of vigilante justice. The hot lines created by
certain codes of conduct to enable the denunciation of activities contrary to
that code, represent another example of means set up to ensure adherence to
network discipline. Some technical systems present a greater interest like the
labelling and rating mechanisms developed by certain servers which both
guarantee and inform the user on the quality of the service being offered
(such as the « privacy friendly » label or the label of web sites of journalistic
information referring to respect of the press code). Obviously, the value of
such a classification depends on the quality of the certifying body that
defined, issued and controlled it. It is appropriate to mention North
American initiatives for the creation of « virtual magistrates », on-line
arbitrators or mediators who are authorised to adjudicate conflicts arising out
of network use, whether they be issues of defamation, intrusion into the
private sphere or non-respect of the rules of a news group. Such alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms have been recently promoted by the
European Draft directive on certain legal aspects of Electronic Commerce in
the internal Market (infra, n°19).
Hence, private regulatory sources set up their own mechanisms for
laying down the rules, controlling their application and finally for
sanctioning non-respect. In certain cases, penalties are delivered by their
own « magistrates ». In the following lines, we will develop considerations
on the various sources of self-regulation.
B. The State norm level
5. THE EMERGENCE OF MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
The State constitutes the legitimate authority for Internet regulation.
The ways and means for the development of norms are meticulously
described in the texts and procedures surrounding this development, thereby
guaranteeing democratic discussion. The application of the norm is granted
to « professional » jurisdictions, surrounded by guarantees of independance
and a contradictory function.
With regard to « electronic environments » (P. Trudel, 1997), we can
observe two distinct tendencies in government regulation. The first is a
preference for notions of variable content, called standards, and the second is
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the entrusting of the interpretation of these standards to relay bodies,
sometimes qualified as independent administrative authorities. If we take the
Belgian model as a simple example, the body responsible for dealing with
privacy issues is the Privacy Protection Commission (Commission de
Protection de la vie privée). The body responsible for the regulation of the
audio-visual sector is the Higher Audiovisual Council (Conseil Superieur de
l’Audiovisuel) or the Media Council (Mediaraad), in the telecommunications
sector the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications (Institut Belge
des Postes et Telecommunications) (Y. Poullet, 1993). All these agencies
have developed a proactive approach vis à vis the sectors concerned and
elaborate different guidelines or recommendations with the imput of the
sectors. This phenomenon might be, according to M.E. Price and S. Verhulst
(1999), considered as expressions of self-regulation even if it might be
difficult to consider that, in those cases, the norms are elaborated voluntarily
by the sectors themselves in fact they are issued rather with their input.
6.THE GROWING COMPETENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OR SUPRANATIONAL
AUTHORITIES
The international dimension of information superhighways leads States
to search, at the international level, for models to develop the law, or for co-
operation among national authorities (B. Frydman, 1997). Through
international conventions such as those of the UNO, I.T.U., W.T.O.,
W.I.P.O., O.E.C.D, bodies such as the G7, through treaties of police co-
operation amongst States engaged in the fight against cybercrime (cf. the
draft for an International Internet Charter presented by France to the
O.E.C.D.), a number of public initiatives have been taken to maintain the
role of the State in the protection and safeguarding of individual rights and
of the public interest. Some (J.J. Lavenue, 1996) go so far as to suggest the
creation of an « International Cyberspace Authority », in reaction to
movements for the emancipation of Internet law and to the increasing power
of private norms. The « Global Business Dialog »2 pr moted by former
European Commissioner. M. Bangemann stressed the importance of setting
up this global authority and fixing global rules for the electronic commerce.
                                                
2. The idea to have a global charter underlining the need for a strengthened international co-operation
was expressed in September 1997 at the « interactive forum of the I.T.U ». Later, the European
Commission has issued a communication (Feb.98) on the « Globalisation and the Information
Society- The need for strengthened International Co-ordination» which aims to provide both a
business dialogue, which should lead to the removal of all technical (including legal) barriers to
electronic commerce and to ensure the political support and leadership in order to ensure a
democratic legitimacy (http://www.gbde.orgf)
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But, when such a solution is envisaged, the complexity of the functioning of
the international fora and democratie deficit are frequently invoked.
Nevertheless, due to the international dimension of the network of networks
and the increasing need to define common rules, activity of international and
supranational authorities is growing.
Moreover we note that these international fora are developing more and
more alternative techniques of rule-making. Thus, the WIPO has issued
guidelines for the attribution of the domain names and Internet addresses.
The OECD is presently drafting guidelines for Consumer Protection in
cyberspace.
C. The private norms level
7. SELF -REGULATION : A MULTIPLE JUSTIFICATION
The justification for this galloping self-regulation is triple3 : the
technical and evolutionary nature of the object that the self-regulation has to
cope with, the fact that only the authors are capable of perceiving the risks
involved in particular solutions and assessing the adequacy and effectiveness
of sanctions. The immediate clamping by access providers of a site
denounced via a hot line mechanism constitutes a more appropriate and
effective response to a pornographic site than any judicial condemnation
(T.I. Hardy, 1994). The possibility of their development and expansion at a
world wild level serves as a supplementary argument, at a time when the
global dimension of cyberhighway problems is uncontested.
Beyond the establishment of norms, self-regulation claims to offer
models for applying these norms to virtual communities, considered as
distinct from spatial communities localised in a given territory and subject to
state legislation. Over the past few years, we have discovered the role played
by network « moderators », like « cybermagistrates », or virtual tribunals
entrusted with the resolution of litigious issues in the virtual world. The
creation of councils entitled to the application of Internet charters represents
another demonstration of self-regulation’s aptitude, not only to develop a
supple system of law, but also to sanction it (H.H. Perritt, 1993).
                                                
3. For extended discussion, see particularly the introduction of the Dutch Code of conduct for the
Electronic Commerce, available at http ://www.ecp.nl/ ; also, the extensive reflections proposed by
P. VAN OMMESLAGHE (1995) on the need for self-regulation practices.
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There is considerable temptation to see self-regulation as more than just
a source of law complementary to that of the State, but rather as a
replacement for the latter (D. Johnson, D. Post, 1996) or in any case to
dispense the State from a meddler regulation.Accordingly, in certain cases,
the private norm may take the place of a legislation : for example, the
manner in which the delicate question of the attribution of Internet’s
domain-names is currently dealt with certainly argues a good case for the
integrity and sufficiency of self-regulatory solutions (A. Wilkinson, 1998).
In other cases, and the present debate between the U.S. administration and
the E-U authorities about the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles is a good
example, the code of conduct or the private norm, even if this self-regulation
solution is promoted even requested by the public authorities4, may permit
the latter not to set up an intricate and complex administrative and regulatory
system which is considered as not useful beyond the vague legal principles
already recognised by the Courts. (B.Gellmann, 1998). In other respects,
without being naïve, we must realise that such a system of regulation by the
parties themselves is far from being gratuitous. Operators are concerned by
such measures either to side-step national legislation or to subject them to a
« soft » interpretation, notably to avoid the prosecution. The debate on
pornography via the Internet, arising from certain recent events, and the
resulting proliferation of self-regulatory measures in this respect, illustrates
this argument well.
8. CONTRACTS
Contracts is, as such, a way for contracting parties to self-regulate their
relationships. It might also be a way for one party to enforce vis à vis the
other a self-regulatory solution. In this second case, a code of conduct or
another self-regulatory mechanism is integrated into the contract by
reference as an integral part of the general contractual terms. As regards the
first use of the contractual tool, it has been clearly asserted by a number of
authors that the interactivity of networks gives the consent of the internet’s
user unprecedented implications. Today, the consumer has in fact the
opportunity to give his/her consent on multiple occasions, such as to say yes
or no to a cookie, to agree to a particular process, to reveal his identity or
not, to object to non-solicited correspondence, etc. Whatever the issue,
technology renders the netizen responsible for his or her actions (R. Dunne,
                                                
4. The Dutch Code of conduct is another good example of this «promotion» by the public authority
insofar as the drafting of this code of conduct has been initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Economy
who was present through representatives during the whole drafting process.
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1994 ; P. Trudel, 1996). Conscious of the role played by contracts, some
authors are tempted by the contractual paradigm and consider that State
responsibility to regulate has been transferred to the responsibility of the
citizen, who by his or her consent chooses to authorise, or not, an operation.
The principles of autonomous will and the law of covenant,
unanimously recognised in every jurisprudence, give this approach,
considerable weight. The contractual approach evidently requires that the
technology permits such choices. Hence the questions : « does the Netizen
wish to be identified ? for what purposes ? within which time limit ? » , must
be the object of on-screen choice pages. The system’s configuration must
guarantee the respect of such choices.
The idea to incorporate self-regulation as an integral part of the contract
is emphasised by the draft directive on certain aspects of e-commerce.
Hence, Article 10 of the draft directive asserts the Internet Service providers
have to provide an easy access to the code of conduct to which they
subscribe and give to the internet users a possibility to store it and to
reproduce it. For example, an Internet access provider might include in his
general contractual provisions the self-regulatory norms under which the
subscriber might neither send illicit or harmful messages nor unsollicited e-
mail for commercial purposes.
9. CERTIFICATION
In a global environment where the network represents the sole means of
communication, certification by which a third party guarantees the specific
quality of a person or product appears an adequate solution.
The aim of certification is to assure the netizen of the existence and
address of his interlocutor, and of his professional status. Beyond this, other
questions arise with respect to the conformity of the other’s products to this
or that norm, on the respect of this or that privacy legislation, on the respect
of consumer protection standards and, finally, with respect to the issue of the
general security of the sites. Certification presents a solution which may be
complementary either to a state normative source, or to a code of conduct or
other self regulatory solution, inasmuch as it refers either to a law, or only or
furthermore to a code of good conduct (D. Gobert, A. Salaün, 1999).
Essentially it is based either on the quality both of the certifying authority
(independence, expertise) and their verification procedures (quality of the
audit) and either on the effective responsibility of these authorities in the
event of an unwarranted issue of a certificate. Finally, certification permits
easy and effective sanctioning, inasmuch as the company or individual fears
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the loss of certification and the negative publicity that it would entail (Y.
Poullet- J.Royen, 1998).
10. SITE LABELLING AND FILTERING TECHNIQUES
Technology comes to the rescue of law. It is in this context that we can
explain the tendency to develop labelling techniques (Webtrust, Trust-e), to
introduce filtering systems such as PICS (Platform for Internet Content
Selection) or to negotiate systems like P3P (Platform for Privacy
Preferences). The idea is simple : every « data product » could be examined
with reference to its conformity with threshold standards such as decency,
non-violence, respect of privacy, consumer protection, etc. (for example, the
label delivered by the Internet Consumer Protection Agency (ICPA) or by
Trust-e which deals only with questions of conformity to privacy standards)
of or certification of a more global nature (such as the « Webtrust » initiative
developed by the Association of American Accountants).
Such labelling operates a priori in connection with filtering techniques
enabling the netizen to select sites according to personal preferences, even to
negotiate with these sites a peculiar protection or on the contrary, to abandon
it (J-M. Dinant, 1997 and 1999; J. Reidenberg, 1998).
Labelling laws still have to be drawn up in order to answer questions
such as what criteria would decide whether this or that site must obtain a
label ? Can we even envisage a challenge of the criteria ? What degree of
transparency must be expected from the criteria ? What will be the
responsibilities of labelling authorities ? What legal recognition would be
granted to such labels ? Which role does the State have to play as regards the
recognition of labelling authorities ? And, finally, what kind of sanctions
(private or public) should be imposed for failure to respect the conditions ?
(on all these points, see Louveaux, Poullet, Salaün, 1999).
11. BEST PRACTICES
Beyond the codified and well identified sources we have referred to so
far, we must also deal with more diffuse principles which are to be found in
the « Acceptable Use Policies « suggested by Internet access providers, the
servers. This « Netiquette » is a set of « 10 commandments » or « highway
code of fundamental rules for Internet surfers » (A. Rinaldi, 1995).
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They comprise :
1. You shall not use a computer to harm another person
2. You shall not interfere with another’s work
3. You shall not ferret about in another’s files
4. You shall not use a computer to steal
5. You shall not use a computer to bear false witness
6. You shall not use or copy a program for which you have not paid
7. You shall not use the resources of another’s computer without authorisation
8. You shall not misappropriate another’s intellectual creation
9. You shall envisage the social consequences of the program you are writing
10.You shall use the computer in a manner which shows consideration and respect
As regards the infringement of these rules, sanctions may take the form
of organised reaction such as : « flaming », disconnection of an indelicate
user, threat of contacting the police etc.
The comparison between such practices, spontaneously developed by
virtual communities, and the rules of conduct habitually practised by trading
communities, leads to claims that « lex electronica » resembles « lex
mercatoria » (B. Wittes, 1995). The similarity is attractive. Some authors (B.
Frydman, 1997; J.N. Brouir, 1996) criticise the dominant economic debate
as one which would « lead to the submission of the information society in
general, and the activities of the Internet in particular, solely to the laws of
the international marketplace ».
This parallel tends to lend authority to the considerations which will
follow (infra n° 20 and ff.) on the role of government regulations in relation
to these diverse regulatory techniques. Before analysing this role we wish to
add a last remark on the role of the technology vis -à-vis the law.
D. Towards a lex informatica
12. ON THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
Technology can reinforce the effectiveness of law. Without such a
reinforcement it would either become a dead letter or be poorly served by
classic judicial procedures that are neither rapid nor effective. A site of the
holocaust would certainly be better countered by mechanisms such as
filtering or the clamping of its access, as envisaged by the « Internet
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Charter » , than by the condemnation by a tribunal. E.C.M.S. (Electronic
Copyright Management Systems), are more capable than legislation, at
protecting an author’s copyright. All these remarks support the opinions of
certain authors (J. Reidenberg, 1997) that the so called « lex informatica »
(that means the regulation by technical norms), is to be preferred to classical
legal norms. One additional major argument in favour of these technical
solutions is also that they provide a substantial « empowerment « of Internet
users who are then able to ensure their own protection or through an
electronic agent put at their disposal or operated by specialised companies5.
This legal/technological axis may be seen from two sides : on the one
hand, the parties themselves are calling for legal measures to legitimise
technical solutions and, on the other hand, the law is calling on the parties to
take those technical measures (Y. Poullet, R. Queck, 1997)
- Some examples of the role of legitimising technical solutions :
The electronic signature, (the first example analysed), demonstrates the
need for security in commercial relationships on an open network such as
the Internet and justifies service provider’s requests for legal recognition of
electronic certification services, or « Certification Authorities » or « Trusted
Third Parties » such as Globalsign or Isabel, whose activities have already
been legalised in some States (Utah, Florida, Germany, Italy) or are about to
be in others. In the case of the electronic copyright administration services
(Electronic Copyright Management Systems), the recent reform of the Berne
Convention on author’s rights criminalizes any attempts to outwit the
technological protection systems offered by copyright management services.
- Some examples of law calling for the taking of technical measures :
The application of the principles of liability could lead a judge to
sanction, in a civil or criminal suit, access providers and servers who have
not taken acceptable and appropriate technical measures to prevent possible
harm to clients using their services. It is in response to such fears and
particularly the fear of a legislative intervention like the « Decency Act »)
that American industrialists have developed the filter standard known as «
Platform for Internet Content Sélection » (PICS) referred to above (supran°
11). It is quite clear that the legislator sometimes has an interest to maintain
high level standards of liability as a way to exercise pressure on the
                                                
5. Certain companies are offering anonymous remailer’s services; others ensure navigation’s service in
order to select web pages not offending certain values; finally, companies might provide authors the
benefit of E.C.M.S.
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economic actors so that these actors will develop technological solutions in
order to escape from their liability.
13. SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE « LEX INFORMATICA  »
The trend to find within the technology itself the appropriate solution to
compensate the present legal protection failure is fascinating. Nevertheless,
we would like to emphasise two important dangers linked with these
technological solutions.
Firstly, it is important to scrutinise very attentively if these
technological solutions are in strict compliance with the legal norms and,
beyond the text, with their fundamental aims. It is important that lawyers
examine carefully if the « privacy », « copyright », « consumer protection »,
enhancing technologies are in strict conformity with the legal requirements
as regard to the text and also to the spirit of the legal basis. That has not
always been the case : thus, the E.C.M.S do not operate in the full respect of
the equilibrium set up by the copyright legislation between the interested
parties (P. Samuelson, 1999; Dusollier,1999). The « privacy enhancing
technology », such as the P3P platform defines the term of nominative data
differently than the definition given by the European Directive and pays no
special attention to the sensitive data (J-M. Dinant, 1999). The technique has
to respect the law. This conclusion leads to argument in favour of a
« techno-legal approach » that means that the lawyer must both favour the
development of technical solutions enforcing legal solutions and at the same
moment pay attention to the specific legal requirements in order to ensure
these techniques will be fully compatible with those requirements.
Secondly, the technology aims at substituting the intervention of the
public authorities for the protection of certain values, which might be
dangerous. Thus, the P3P system would permit the user to negotiate
(including against financial incentives) his or her right to privacy including
no negotiable rights directly linked with fundamental liberties. The
protection against harmful or illicit messages will be ensured by an
electronic agent or by an information service provider and will be considered
as a value added service that must be compensated financially. The citizen
will be protected only if he is conscious of the risks and if he is able to pay
for his protection. The citizen has to take positive steps in order to get the
adequate protection, which supposes a certain intellectual ability.
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14. ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CHOICE BETWEEN DIFFERENT SELF -REGULATORY
MEASURES
Different self-regulatory mechanisms might be combined. Hence, a
labelling system might refer explicitly, as a condition for granting a label,
that the web site agrees with a code of conduct. A second point must be
underlined. In certain cases, a choice might exist between different
techniques of self-regulation. To illustrate this question6, the recent debate
around the Bertelsmann report is interesting. In order to fight against
harmful or illicit content, the Bertelsmann Report (1999) suggests the need
to establish a comprehensive and global system of filtering elaborated and
implemented by the Internet service providers which might be in that
perspective be considered as the main responsible for regulating the content
of Internet. This scenario differs deeply from the scenario developed by the
advocates of the PICS (C.D.T. 1999). According to this second scenario, it is
suggested that the Internet users will themselves use the filtering system and
choose themselves the rating system of their own choice amongst multiple
rating services existing and developed freely within the market.
This second scenario appears more respectful of the principle of
freedom of expression than the first one which undoubtedly creates the risk
of private censorship more dangerous than the public one. This simple
example of different scenarii possible in order to fight against illegal content
on the Internet demonstrates the need to have a public debate and assessment
of the different techniques used by the self-regulation. Certain are
definitively more compliant with our constitutional and democratic values
than others.
                                                
6. See on that point, more extensively, M. GEVERS et Y. POULLET, “Concernes from a European
User Empowerment Perspective in Internet Content Regulation : An Analysis of some recent
Statement”, Communication et Stratégies, to be published.
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CHAPTER 2 : THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATION IN THE
(ADMISSION) RECEPTION AND PROMOTION OF « PRIVATE »
SOURCES OF CYBERSPACE LAW
15. PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS : AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE LEGAL
PLURALISM
P. Trudel (1997), paraphrasing an observation from H.H. Perritt (1992),
has written that : « the parties engaged in international transactions, for
example, have developed law-creating practices. Interesting parallels can be
drawn here with the regulation of electronic-commercial environments, even
though we cannot currently speak of the emergence of a genuine corpus of
generally applicable rules. The future of this process of normalisation will
be favoured by the development of international arbitration general
practices, carried through without regard to differing national legislation.
Even if the customs and practices of a given field of activity are often taken
into account and, to a certain degree, integrated into state legislation, the
nub of such a norm still rests in its capacity to autonomously organise
behaviour and transactions among the members of a community. Respect of
these customs and practices is, under certain circumstances, an essential
prerequisite for a participant’s admission to a given community. If the
importance of the community justifies it, these customs and practices can
constitute a complete regulatory technique, parallel to state legislation,
regulating the relationships among the members of a community and
administered by their own authorities. The model of lex mercatoria from the
middle ages is frequently cited as an example. Several current debates are
involved with the opportunity of developing a similar legal framework for
the regulation of cyberspace; this issue will be analysed here  ».
The doctrinal reflection on lex mercatoria has led a number of authors
(Rigaux, 1977; Santi Romano, 1975) to see in it the opportunity for a clear
and unarguable recognition of our essential legal pluralism. Developing this
idea, Rigaux (1977) writes : « the citizen of a state may possess goods in, or
reside in, another state, adhere to an organized religious confession, be a
member of a transnational professional organization. The law of each of the
states to which he is subject, the law of the church to which he is affiliated,
the contractual engagements to which he subscribes in the exercise of his
individual economic rights, these all present a variety of distinct legal
authorities, each one but imperfectly suited to the others. »
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In this perspective, self-regulatory systems and, more generally, those
private sources of legislation that some choose to refer to as « soft » law,
seem in fact to be legal systems in the full sense of the term.
According to van de Kerckove and Ost (1988) and other authors7, a
structured and evolutive complex of elements interlinked between them and
presenting a certain identity internally and vis à vis other legal systems.
These legal systems might be in conflict, placed in juxtaposition or be
considered as complementary. Certain like the international ones might be
considered by the Constitution as having a hierarchical superiority vis à vis
national ones8. But anyway, when they are recognised by another legal
system, particularly the State legal system, their value is asserted as such,
even though their creation may seem less legitimate than a more traditional
public process of enactment.
16. THE TRIPLE CRITERIA OF A LEGAL NORM
According to authors such as Ost (1984)9, it is possible to characterise
the validity of a legal norm following three criteria : the first one is the
legitimacy of their authors : this quality means that the authorities in charge
of the norm promulgation might be habilitated for doing that by the
community of the persons which will have to respect the rule they have
enacted. This legitimacy is obvious as regards the traditional State
authorities insofar their power is defined by fundamental legal texts like the
Constitution. It is less obvious when the self-regulation is the expression of
certain obscure associations or even of certain private companies able to
impose their technical standards. We will come back to the way to define a
minimum set of rules concerning the legitimacy of the rule-maker. The
                                                
7. About the concept of «legal system», we invite the reader to have a look at the fundamental writing
of J. Raz, The concept of a legal system, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 2e ed.
8. See on that point the interesting assertion of the European Court of Justice in the famous case Costa
v. Enel (1964 E.C.R. 585; C.M.L.R., 425 (1964) : « By creating a community of unlimited duration,
having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity of representation on the
international plan and more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer of powers from the Members states have limited the sovereign rights and have thus created a
body of law which binds both the national and themselves».
9. Our triple criteria are a bit different from those envisaged by OST. This author refers mainly to the
legal norms created by constitutional State authorities and in that context envisages three criteria of
validity : the formal on which is the legality principle that means the fact that the creation of the
norm has followed the rules of competence, of procedure imposed by the legal system and that its
content is in conformity with hierarchically superior norms ; the empirical one which is the
effectiveness principle which envisages to what extent on the one side, the authorities in charge of
the control and respect of the rule are effectively ensuring this respect and on the other side, the
citizens or addressees are conscious of the existence of the norm; finally the « axiological » one,
which means that the content of the norm complies with ethical and fundamental values.
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second criterion is definitely the conformity of the content vis à vis another
or others legal rules. Again this criterion is quite easy to satisfy in case of
traditional regulations where each regulations must be taken in consideration
with already existing rules with superior value. It seems more intricate to
satisfy when the compliance with existing legislative text is precisely not
existing insofar the self-regulation is frequently a way to avoid traditional
regulatory methods of rule-making. Finally, the last criterion of a legal norm
is the effectiveness of its respect. By his criterion, one means the fact for
legal norm to foresee a cost for its non respect and for the addressees of the
norm to be aware of the content of the norm and sufficiently stimulated to
respect it. The effectiveness is different from the efficacy of the norm, that
means that the rule achieves the result pursued by its authors. The
effectiveness of a legislative solution is ensured by its publication (that is the
way by which the legal norm is brought to the attention of each citizen) , by
the foreseeable penalties and finally by the fact that administration or the
courts will ensure the control of this respect and sanction infringements. In
case of self-regulation, the publicity, the control and the sanctions are to be
ensured differently. We will come back (infra, n° 24) to that difficult point
which is critical for the value of the self-regulation.
17. THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
Since the Maastricht Treaty10, the European principle of
« subsidiarity » principle is considered as fundamental to understand both
the continuity between different levels of regulatory powers and the partition
of competencies between the Members States and the institutions. The
principle must be summarised as follows : the European Union may only act
on matters that are no more strictly within the boundaries of a Member State
competence. Beyond this European meaning of this principle, we see the
subsidiarity principle as hermeneutic key principle to fix the boundaries of
the different regulatory techniques and bodies including the self-regulatory
ones. In other words, the subsidiarity principle might be defined as follow :
everything you can fix better locally or by self-regulatory solutions must be
fixed locally or by self-regulatory solutions
According to this statement, the subsidiarity principle has two different
meanings : the first one is the assertion that local solutions are still needed
and must even be preferred to international or global solutions insofar as the
                                                
10. Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1992, O.J. (C.224) 1 (Feb. 7, 1992). About this principle and
its understanding, see notably J. CLOOS, G. REINESCH, D. VIGNES, J. WEYLAND , Le traité de
Maastricht : Genèse, Analyse, Commentaires, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1993, 140 and ff.
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latter have to procure the general framework wherein these local solutions
will take place and interoperate. From our point of view, local solutions, that
means regional (from a geographical point of view) or sectorial, are the best
way to take into account the cultural or business peculiarities of each
situation and to develop adequate solutions. Otherwise, the regulations will
be reduced to the enumeration of very vague and broad common principles.
The second meaning of the concept envisages the subsidiarity principle
as a way to validate and fix the limits of the coexistence between the
traditional regulatory model, the legislative one and the more « modern »
one : self-regulation. In our opinion, certain concerns might be more
appropriately addressed by the selfregulatory solutions than by legislative
ones. The complementarily of these two approaches has been broadly
asserted by many authors. Following this perspective, the question to be
addressed is the criteria according to which we might judge that a solution is
better solved by self-regulatory solutions. In our opinion, it is the case when
it is considered that under the three criteria of the legal system validity self-
regulation is deemed to be more appropriate than public regulation. To take
an example, it is totally justified that consumer protection rules are set by
public regulation insofar as public interests are concerned. But, at the same
time, if we might also consider, as a general principle, that a free and
informed consumer’s consent has to be embodied in a public regulation
applied differently following the sectors, according to the nature or the
financial importance of the transactions. So, the setting-up of web pages , the
place of the standardised contractual terms in order to meet this general
requirement will be more efficiently discussed and decided within the
different sectors (e.g. the travel sector’s European associations might
together with the consumer’s associations fix precise rules on the subject
which will be different than those discussed within the Banking sector for
financial products )
If the subsidiarity principle does plead clearly for the diversity and
legitimacy of various regulatory techniques as regards both their territorial
validity and their nature, a question will be raised : how to ensure the
interoperability between these various regulatory expressions ? The principle
of adequate protection (infra, n° 27) and the traditional technique of mutual
recognition might be an answer to these concerns.
18. TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
Hence, the questions raised by the relationships between the different
legal systems are the following :
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— first, is there a certain specificity in the traditional State legal
system;
— second, what are the criteria the State legal system will follow to
accept other legal systems ?
As regards the first question, it seems that the State legal system might
be considered not as a monopoly that would be against the recognition of the
legal pluralism, but as offering an ultimate recourse to analyse the validity of
the other legal systems and to control the lawfulness of the solutions these
other legal systems provide. Nobody might prevent any other person from
suing in case of litigation before a judicial court.
As regards the second question, three considerations must be
addressed :
The first one (A ) analyses how the traditional State legal system will
receive the other legal systems through the application of four fundamental
principles. The second consideration (B ) scrutinises the recent official
European documents in order to see how they deal with the problem of self-
regulation validity and the respect of the three criteria developed above :
legitimacy, conformity and effectiveness. The third consideration (C) is the
analysis of two provisions of the Data Protection Directive taking into
account, directly or indirectly, the problem of self-regulation.
A. The acceptation of private sources by State law
19. THREE PRINCIPLES ARE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT : CONTRACT , FAIR TRADE
AND RESPONSIBILITY
The general and universal principles of State law, particularly those of
contractual autonomy, fair and equitable trade and responsibility can be
taken initially as a control model for private sources of « Cyberlaw ».
In that context, one has to underline the different targets pursued by the
authors of a code of conduct. The sole target of self-regulation was to fix the
rules of behaviour between the actors, represented in the process of the code
of conduct drafting and negotiating. The main aim is then to avoid unfair
and wild competition between them. Sometimes, the code of conduct will
pursue another goal and provide solution with external effects. Thus, when
self-regulation defines the acceptable professional behaviour vis à vis third
parties concerned by the operations regulated by the code of conduct, it is
clear that it intends to have effects vis à vis third parties including especially,
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but not only, parties contracting with the actors submitted to the code of
conduct. For example, if a Direct Marketing Association forbids or on the
contrary accepts certain advertising methods or messages, this attitude might
affect third parties regardless of the fact that they will become contractual
parties. This external effect of the code of conduct is from the legal point of
view more questionable than the internal effects.
As regards the external opposability of the code of conduct to persons
who are not only third parties but could become contracting parties and in
that quality, could be considered as submitted to the content of the code of
conduct. It would without doubt be sufficient for a judge to go « to the limits
of contractual logic » , as M. Vivant (1997) assures us, to become aware of
the absence of fully free and informed consent from the netizen in accepting
a ‘policy’ or a code of conduct that barely respects his interests. This
approach will put into question not only the content of the private norm, its
conformity with the legal rules, its clarity, and its possible unfair character
but also, the integration of the code of conduct within the scope of the
contract, which might be questionable when the code of conduct is referred
to only on a web site through a hyperlink difficult to activate11.
As regards the other « third parties » which might be considered as
harmed by a behaviour, although in strict conformity with the content of the
code, the recourse to standards such as « good faith », « pater familias » ; «
as well as possible « often permit lip service to the adoption of an ethical
code, that could represent a professional standard whose infringement
automatically constitutes a fault (F. Osman, 1995). On the contrary, recourse
to standards authorises the denunciation of self-regulation or systems of
certification whose content does not seem to comply with such standards.
The adoption by certain actors within a sector of « codes of conduct »
or of « technical norms » may be intended to harm competition in some way.
It will be sufficient to invoke the principles of free and fair trade to strip
them of all value.
20. REJECTION OF PRIVATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS WHERE PUBLIC ORDER HAS BEEN
CONTRAVENED
The body of case law dealing with the activities of professional
association, either at the time of the enactment of disciplinary rules either
                                                
11. As regards this point see article 10 of the Draft proposal of Directive on certain legal aspects of the
electronic commerce, which imposes on the information service provider to provide to the customer
a direct access notably by hyperlink and the ability to store and reproduce the codes of conduct to
which the I.S.P. refers.
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during their application, allows us to extrapolate certain rules which are
relevant when tackling the subject of self-regulation in cyberspace. This
equally applies to legal systems whose right to create norms is undisputed.
Case law has sometimes, called them into question, particularly in the
following situations (N. Decoopman, 1989).
·  When the norm is in conflict with a State norm judged to be of
public interest. For example, a code of conduct authorising a
server to process data obtained by means of cookies, without prior
information of the netizen concerned would constitute an
infringement of the principle of transparency upheld by the Data
Protection Directive. Furthermore, the space available for self-
regulation is reduced each time a conflict involves a superior
motive or fundamental value. State law will either by decree or by
recognition proclaim such norms as of public interest. This
assertion should, however, be moderated by the following
consideration : the efficacy of the state norm can be reduced
insofar as State authority does not possess the means to enforce it.
In such a hypothesis, the State recognised norm is granted a value
more symbolic than real, and self-regulation may represent the
lesser evil ;
·  When the application of the norm represents an abuse of rights
inasmuch as the sanction is disproportionate to the infraction
concerned, or its levying has not taken into account the minimum
right of the defence foreseen by Article 6 of the European Human
Rights Convention. This question is delicate so far self-regulation
does claim to external effects particularly when privacy or
consumer protection questions are addressed by the code of
conduct or by technical norms. One would like to underline the
very interesting solution set down in by the Article 17 of the
Directive on certain legal aspects of the electronic commerce
(200/3, 8 June 2000)  : « Member States shall ensure that bodies
responsible for out of court settlements of consumers apply the
principles of independence and transparency, the adversarial
principle, and the principles of effectiveness of the procedure,
legality of the decisions, liberty of parties and representation ».
In an Internet context there are certainly sanctions which, through their
unilateral application by less than transparent authorities without any
external control, may be deemed abusive of a party’ s rights. Thus the
immediate revoking of a server’s certificate for alleged behavioural non-
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conformity to a code of conduct may appear as unacceptable censorship to a
state authority concerned with the respect of freedom of expression and the
principle of unrestricted defence.
B. The application of the three criteria of validity of the legal norms vis à
vis self-regulation in recent official European Documents
21. THE MULTIPLIED REFERENCES TO SELF -REGULATION IN RECENT OFFICIAL
EUROPEAN DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
It is difficult to enumerate all the references to self-regulation made by
the official documents on the Information Society but the following
examples are quite significant in order to illustrate the approach chosen by
the European Union as regards the value of this self-regulation.
The European Commission Green Paper on Commercial
communications in the internal market of May 8, 199612 considers self-
regulation as an integral part of the regulatory framework applicable to
commercial communications. Therefore, the Commission recommends that
these self-regulatory instruments should be assessed as regards their
proportionality vis à vis their purposes. Furthermore, the Commission
recommends that these instruments be publicly available and that the
complaints procedure should be accessible from abroad.
The European Council Recommendation dated 24th of September
199813 « about the development of the competition within the audiovisual
and information services by promoting the protection of minors and human
dignity » goes further. A number of indicative guidelines are annexed to the
recommendation. These guidelines are aimed at ensuring a full participation
of all interested parties (public authorities, consumers, users and industries)
in the drafting, implementation, evaluation and control of the respect of the
codes of conduct. This participation is judged necessary in order to
legitimate the recourse to self-regulatory solutions.
The Directive on certain legal aspects of the electronic commerce
establishes in the same way that the consumer associations shall be involved
in the drafting, implementation and evaluation of these codes. Moreover, the
actors must ensure their complete transparency and accessibility.
                                                
12. COM (96) 192.
13. Published in the O.J.98/560/CE.
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 Finally, the European Community in its reply to the WIPO request of
comments about Internet Governance- Management of Internet Domain
Names and Addresses has broadly defended the self-regulatory approach
proposed by the WIPO based on the adoption by each registration authority
of a certain number of « best practices ».
22. THE CRITERION OF LEGITIMACY OF THE AUTHORS FOLLOWING THESE
DOCUMENTS
As mentioned above, the Directive on e-commerce, like the one on the
protection against illicit and harmful content requires very clearly that all
interested parties in the application of self-regulation be involved in the
drafting, implementation and evaluation of the codes of conducts14. It means
that in case of unilateral drafting, the validity of these self-regulatory
instruments might be questioned before the Courts.
The list of the categories of interested parties might differ according to
the content of the code of conduct. It is quite clear that the prior consultation
of the sole consumer associations will not be considered as sufficient if
certain provisions of the code of conduct address specifically the problem of
privacy or of illegal content of the messages. In that context, different
cultural or philosophical associations must be consulted.
The criterion of legitimacy in case of a self-regulation might be more
easily fulfilled in certain countries than others. It is obvious that the
bargaining power of consumers associations those associations defending
cultural values or fundamental liberties is more important in the U.S. than in
the E.U. This statement might explain the better acceptance of the self-
regulation mechanisms in the U.S. than in the E.U. It might be feared that in
Europe, the legitimacy of a code of conduct concluded by the sole private
parties will be deemed as not sufficiently legitimated without the arbitration
of the public bodies intervening in order to ensure an adequate balance
between the different interests. The Dutch Code of Conduct on electronic
Commerce concluded under the auspices of the Dutch government is a good
example of this.
                                                
14. Compare : « To be effective, codes of conduct must be the product of and be enforced by self-
regulatory agencies. Such agencies must be broadly representative and accessible to all relevant
parties…. Effective self-regulation requires active consumer and citizen consultation by such
agencies. Without user involvement, a self regulatory mechanism will not accurately reflect user
needs, will not be effective in delivering standards it promotes, and will fail to create confidence»
(Self-regulation of Internet Content, Memorandum of the Bertelsmann Foundation, available at
http://www.Bertelsmann- stiftung.de ).
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23. THE CRITERION OF CONFORMITY FOLLOWING THESE DOCUMENTS
Two remarks might be addressed. The first one is that most of the
documents require that the self-regulation in full respect of the legislation
applicable ensures a specific (sectored or tailored to the technical specificity
of the operation) application of the principles enacted by that legislation. So
self-regulation is viewed as a complementary legal system. The fact that the
principles embodied into the legislation are often very vague offers to the
authors large possibilities of choice in order to reach the legislative
requirements. The second point is the assertion that the European
Commission must be informed systematically about the content of the codes
of conduct in order to assess not only the compliance of the code of conduct
vis à vis the legislation but their overall proportionality as regards these
legislative requirements15. That means that self-regulatory mechanisms may
not be used as a way to introduce barriers to the free movement of goods or
free trade of services.
24. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SELF -REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS UNDER THE
EUROPEAN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
·  Most European documents insist on the necessity to publish and
make accessible as far as possible the content and interpretation of
the code of conduct to the Internet users in order to create a full
awareness of it. A second point has to be made. The major argument
of self-regulation is the fact that it offers more effective mechanisms
than the legislative means. This argument is taken seriously into
consideration by the European Union which requires under the
communication on illegal and harmful content that certain self-
regulation mechanisms be set up such as complaints procedures, hot
lines, immediate blocking systems, etc. Furthermore, European
institutions underline the necessity for the sanctions provided both
by self-regulatory mechanisms and by legislative provisions to be «
effective, dissuasive and proportionate » in order to avoid abuses.
We have already underlined (see, supra n°20) that the Alternative
Dispute Resolution (A.D.R.) Mechanisms to be created in the
context of codes of conduct, must obey to the fundamental
principles of due process and that they must be accessible to any
complaining party.
                                                
15. See thereabout the directive on e-commerce and the Green paper on commercial communications
quoted above.
102 CAHIERS DU CRID — n° 20
C. The promotion of the private legal systems : considerations on certain
provisions of the 95/46 data protection directive
25. TWO TYPES OF PROMOTION
Taking as starting point two provisions of the Directive referred to, we
would like to show :
1) how State law articulates both public and private norms and thereby
promotes the adoption of the latter (with reference to Article 27)  ;
2) how a national legal authority, while respecting the culture and
system of other legal authorities, can establish certain criteria for the
recognition of private norms conceived in those other juridic
authorities (with reference to Article 25).
26. MONITORED CODES OF CONDUCT
Article 27 §1 of the Directive provides that « The Member States and
the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct
intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the national
provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive, taking
account of the specific features of the various sectors ». The editors of such
codes could submit them to monitoring authorities who would verify their
conformity with existing regulations.
The text also envisages the drawing up of community codes which
could be submitted to a European data protection group that would
examine their compliance with the national provisions.
Once the codes have been submitted for their inspection, both the
national monitoring authority and the European group could, «
should they deem it appropriate « , gather the opinions of the
persons concerned or their representatives. Finally, depending on
whether the code was national or European, each of these
authorities respectively could take steps to ensure publication
(Boulanger et alii, 1997).
The Directive’s aim is simple : both self-regulation and
certification represent effective tools for the directive’s enactment.
They contribute to the improvement of the brand image of those
who submit to these self-regulatory instruments and increase the
confidence of the netizen. Their flexibility and specificity make
them suitable for evolutive solutions adapted to the particularities
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of each sector. Finally, their European character serves to
guarantee equivalence of protection with regard to electronic
processes operating in any corner of the continent.
Recognition by State authorities of these codes of conduct takes two
forms.
·  the formal procedure of confirmation does not only apply to the
basic criteria which constitute respect to the provisions of the
directive, but also to more procedural criteria : the publishing of the
content of self-regulation or criteria for certification, the
transparency and openness of debates, taking into account the range
of parties interested in these processes, in particular those directly
concerned;
·  in any event, the codes of good conduct cannot exempt the Data
controller from applicable areas of national legislation derived from
the directive which guarantee the respect of subjective rights and the
possibility for the persons concerned to go to law. Such submission
to the law brings to codes, a certain legal weight, given the fact that
the law, accompanied by the restraining force of justice, remains the
ultimate guarantee of the effectiveness of the principles enunciated
therein.
27. « ADEQUATE » PROTECTION , OR HOW A STATE AUTHORITY CAN IMPOSE ITS
VALUES IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER ON A THIRD COUNTRY IN THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION SOCIETY (Y. POULLET , B. HAVELANGE )
Article 25.1 of the Directive provides that « The Member States shall
provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may
take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national
provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the
third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection ». The
principle is therefore to prohibit transmission unless an adequate level of
protection can be proven by the third country.
The Directive, rendering this yet more precise in Article 25.2, goes on
to say that an evaluation of the adequate nature of data protection in a third
country must take into account « all circumstances relating to a transfer or
type of transfer » and in particular the different factors, of which some are
inherent to the type of transfer being considered, such as the nature of the
data itself, the finality and the duration of the process, the country of origin
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and the country of destination, and others concerning the level of protection
in the third country such as « current legal provisions both general and
sectorial, as well as professional rules and the security measures which are
respected there ».
In particular, the text of Article 25 presumes a functional approach, that
is to say, that the protection should be evaluated according to the risk of the
breach, risk arising from the type of flow, as according to the specific or
general measures undertaken by the party responsible for the data in the
third country to reduce such risks.
The evaluation of these measures should be made without any bias.
There is no question here of imposing European mechanisms to third
countries but rather to appreciate to what level the goals of protection
pursued by the Directive are encountered there, whether in an original way
or not. In this sense, the idea of adequate protection does not in any sense
represent a weakening of the data protection envisaged by the Directive. In
fact, the idea of adequate protection induces a confrontation between the
protective demands of the directive and the responses given by the third
country. The aim is to see whether there is a « functional similarity ». The
« functional similarity » implies that we are concerned to find, not a pure
and simple transposition of European principles and systems of protection in
the third country, but rather the presence of those elements fulfilling the
required functions, even if the said elements are of a different character to
those we are familiar with in Europe. This certainly encourages a better
respect of the local structures and legal characteristics than would the
requirement of equivalent protection, which calls for complete legislative
similarity.
In particular, with regard to the protective instruments created in the
third country, Article 25 does not only refer to norms established by public
authority, whether general or sectorial in character, but equally to codes of
conduct or technical measures, provided these are « respected ». Thus the
person entrusted with evaluating foreign protection would be more attentive
to the « effectiveness « of an instrument than to its nature : what matters is
that the knowledge of the instrument in question, even if it is just a simple
company privacy policy, be widespread among the persons concerned and
among those responsible for files. Similarly the trustee would be mindful of
the option of claims or appeal by individuals calling those responsible to
account in the event of any non-respect of these instruments. Finally, he
would meticulously evaluate the quality of the authority in charge of claims
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and appeals, its accessibility and its functional transparency (Working Paper
of the Art. 29 Working Group, 1998).
28. REGARDING THE CONDITIONS OF SELF -REGULATION
What conclusions can we draw from these two provisions of the Data
Protection directive as lessons both as to the value of private norms and to
the synergy between these and the norms established by the State ?
First, the private norm is the best accepted, being defined within the
framework of principles or standards established by the State norm. Such
standards not only enable an evaluation of the private norm’s conformity of
content to society’s expectations, but also assures its greater effectiveness.
Second, the private norm may be deemed « adequate » with regard to
the State norm if the procedure under which it was drawn up conforms to
certain demands of legitimacy : firstly, has that procedure permitted the
expression of the opinions of, and taken into consideration the interests of,
the different parties concerned by the operations to be regulated; and
secondly, is the norm in question transparent. Is it genuinely effective, i.e
can binding sanctions be handed down by an authority equipped with powers
of investigation, acting independently, easily accessible to all and whose
dealings are transparent (for example, via a public report of its activities, or
the publishing of its decisions)  ?
CONCLUSIONS
29. THE STATE NORM : A NECESSARY INTERVENTION
We must ask, with regard to state sources : what is the use of a national
legislation when, as we have shown, the international character of the
network, and the impossibility of mastering the space-time co-ordinates of
exchanges lead us to admit the impotence of nation states in the effective
application of the norms they have drawn up ? The emotion caused in 1996
by the intervention of a German court, charging access servers with having
allowed the access to pornographic material, shows however, that even if
state law does not have completely effective instruments at its disposal, it is
nonetheless capable of motivating private parties to put self-regulatory
solutions in place that are at least partially (if not totally) satisfactory. The
State, therefore, cannot simply resign, but rather, without pretending to
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police the network in a thorough manner, it should duly call attention to the
social values that enshrine the norms, even if this is only in order to provoke
appropriate self-regulatory reflexes and to serve as their basis. It is
noticeable that even in the U.S, country which is deemed to be the leader in
the defence of the self-regulatory solutions, the public bodies are playing an
increasing role in the promotion of these solutions. In August 98, Mr
Pitofsky, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, asserted : « Unl ss
Industry can demonstrate that it is developed and implemented broad-based
and effective self-regulatory programs by the end of this year, additional
government authority would be appropriate and necessary ».
Since this assertion before the Congress, the American Government has
taken different initiatives like the « Global Alliance » in order to protect
privacy efficiently, in the context of its discussion with the European Union
according to the request of Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive.
Furthermore, the search within supra-national bodies, such as Unesco,
for common principles and solutions in areas such as the protection of
minors, of consumers, of the signature etc., encourages the normalising of
working channels, indeed co-operation (even if only among police forces)
between states. In the absence of such a consensus, the position taken by a
supra-national organisation such as the European Union can serve as a
starting point for international negotiation with other countries also entrusted
with the search, doubtless via means more in keeping with their own legal
traditions, for adequate protection vis a vis the principles enunciated by the
European Union.
Facing the social revolution that the Internet represents, particularly the
dislocation of space-time frontiers, state law, the expression of the social
regulation of behaviour, is — and has a right to remain — present. The law
cannot allow itself to be content with deploring the limitations placed on its
own enforcement and affirming the essential lawlessness of cyberspace. On
the contrary, it must find, in the context of a pluralist normative expression,
an adequate active role. As far as possible it will refer, by application,
adaptation or reform of general principles, to the normative mechanisms
present in the network : the application of principles via self-regulation,
technical standardisation. Depending on the case, it will draw its inspiration
for the definition of rules, if possible at the international level, from the
content of internal network regulation. What we are seeing here, to use M.
Vivant’s expression (Vivant, 1997), is without doubt the emergence of
« post modern law », or what J. Reidenberg (1996) refers to as a new «
network governance paradigm ».
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Far from sanctioning the State’s resignation, this « post modern law »,
this new « paradigm » calls for the creation of new forms of dialogue
between diverse ethical and regulatory normative techniques and between
the democratic authorities capable of fostering such a dialogue and placing it
at the service of the public interest.
On the one hand, the State cannot abandon Internet regulation to the
sole initiative of its users. We have seen that, in the absence of specific
regulation, a reaffirmation of major legal principles spurs the parties to take
measures including self-regulatory instruments and leads to the development
of appropriate techniques. The Decency Act case is significant from that
point of view. The fact that a legislative intervention has taken place has led
the Internet industry players to propose rapidly another solution : the P.I.C.S.
in order to fight against illegal and harmful Internet content. It is not sure
that without the legislative pressure, these kind of technological solutions
would have been found quasi instantaneously.
On the other hand, we should like to stress the State’s vital obligation to
intervene at a time when, in our opinion, deserting the Internet and
withdrawing from the field of regulation to such a point that it no longer
even decides the general framework, would notably put at risk public order,
fundamental liberties and other basic values.
Finally, through possibly watchdogs like Privacy Commission, the
State has the imperative duty to check if the fundamental principles :
contract, free competition, rules of the art and public order are respected in
the drafting up and the concrete implementation of self-regulation. It is also
the State’s responsibility to analyse whether the validity conditions of self-
regulations as legal norms are fulfilled. Therefore, it must be ensured that all
interested parties have a real right to participate in the formulation,
evaluation and application process as regards the code of conduct, that the
content of these codes is not prejudicial to legal right and finally that the
code of conduct enforcement will be effective, transparent and
proportionate. This action is necessary. It is not obvious that suddenly the
market driven forces will follow these rules fundamental for the survival of
our democratic society and the individual liberties. From a personal point of
view, to take the example of the control of Internet illicit and illegal
messages, we are more afraid of the private censorship than the public one.
The precise division of labour between the state or supra-national body
and the Internet users remains to be defined. It will doubtless be a dynamic
relationship, that could enable users to demonstrate a certain creativity in the
enactment of the framework proposed by State legislation.
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30. THE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF SELF -REGULATION
This being said, there can be no question of rejecting self-regulation as
a normative source in the fullest sense of the term. As F. Osman (1995)
concluded, whether we choose to see it uniquely as a question of time and
context or the proof that the law must « progressively suffer both the
attraction and the yoke of the economic facts which dominate it and to which
it has become a tributary », such a phenomenon can only serve to awaken
the interest of lawyers who have been taught that the sanction is part of the
mechanism of the rule of law. It naturally arises that they are tempted to
search everywhere, even in « soft law ». And if the criteria of the sanction as
a characteristic of the rule of law is a false criteria, despite doctrinal attempts
to revive it, this is doubtless because the effectiveness of rules of social
conduct, whether they « rule or regulate » , does not necessarily reside in the
adherence to them by the social body for which they are destined.
This consideration, which addresses the normative sources of « lex
mercatoria » ought to be equally applicable to « lex electronica » , but it
cannot have the same range and, without a doubt, this justifies a more
resolute intervention from the State law. Firstly, the netizen environment,
except in the newsgroup context, or in certain situations such as universities
or trade between merchants, does not have anything like the homogeneity of
the professionals. Secondly, where « lex mercatoria » only regulates
economic questions, « lex electronica » is concerned with culture, values and
liberties.
It would appear from this, therefore, that self-regulation should be
controlled. Though it is certainly capable of representing the spontaneous
expression of a particular community, this is rarely the case. Furthermore,
State law is obliged at least to fix the standards which serve as a basis for the
development of self-regulation and its associated normative techniques and
to see to it that the mechanisms for the setting up of these regulatory
techniques and the application of the content of these private norms is
transparent and takes into account the interests of the various parties
concerned. The dialogue must involve all interested parties in a transparent
discussion. That is the duty of the State(s) to impose the effective
participation of certain parties less powerful, that represent what we might
call : the « public voice ».
31. CO-REGULATION OR INTEGRATED EFFECTIVE MIX :
The recent O.E.C.D forum on electronic commerce has extensively
discussed the nature of the relationships between public regulation and self-
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regulation. In our opinion the fundamental recognition of the legal pluralism
does not mean that we are in favour of a co-regulation, which implies
implicitly that the two types of legal systems are placed on the same footing
and that a fixed partition between the competencies of the first and the
second ones are more or less fixed. We prefer to speak about a cooperation
and dialogue between private and public regulations in order to find the best
way to ensure effectively the achievement of public interest objectives, in
the full respect of the balances embedded in our legislation and international
Conventions. Perhaps, that is what we might consider as the « integrated
effective mix between public and private regulations ».
This approach requires a dialogue between multiple bodies, public and
private regulators located at local, sectoral, national, regional and
international level in order to find progressively not common but
interoperable solutions following the « adequacy » methodology. We are not
of opinion that to a global cyberspace corresponds a global regulation or
self-regulation. This fantasy of a global regulatory system does not pay
attention to the fact that the netizens are citizens located in a particular space
with its own culture, way of life and regulatory approach. In other words, it
is necessary to think globally but to act or rule locally.
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